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When the Supreme Court declared almost off-handedly in
Monroe v. Pape that § 1983 was to be interpreted against the "back-
ground of tort liability,"' the Court raised far more questions than it
has ever definitively answered. Are tort rules merely helpful or are
they sometimes (or always) determinative? Are they relevant to
§ 1983 statutory interpretation issues only, or do (and should) they
also guide answers to questions of constitutional interpretation?
Which tort rules are to be used: a "distilled essence" of the common
law of the states or a kind of federal common law? What of the period
from which the tort rules are to be extracted: Must courts be guided
only by the tort law extant in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted by the
Forty-second Congress? Or should the tort rules used in § 1983 inter-
pretation instead reflect the significant changes in tort law in the twen-
tieth century? Remarkably enough, at different times the Supreme
Court has answered every one of these questions in the affirmative,
which brings us to the subject of this Symposium.
This Section 1983 Symposium had its genesis two years ago when
several past and present chairs of the Association of American Law
Schools ("AALS") sections on Civil Rights and Federal Courts agreed
to hold a joint program at the annual January meeting of the AALS.
The important topic chosen by then-chairs Professor George Brown
of Boston College (Federal Courts) and Professor Karen Blum of Suf-
folk University (Civil Rights) was the relationship between § 1983 and
tort law. As a past chair of the Civil Rights section, I suggested at the
time that the Chicago-Kent Law Review would publish any papers re-
sulting from the joint program, together with others of interest, in a
special Section 1983 symposium issue. The suggestion was enthusiasti-
cally accepted by the chairs and the invited speakers, and the result is
this Symposium.
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The three speakers at the AALS program contributed articles
based on their presentations. They are Professor Michael Wells of the
University of Georgia, Professor Christina Whitman of the University
of Michigan, and Professor Laura Oren of the University of Houston.
Professor Jack Beermann of Boston University and I also wrote arti-
cles especially for this Symposium. All of us have written extensively
and thought deeply about § 1983 and the relationship between it and
tort law in particular.
Professor Wells, in his article Constitutional Torts, Common Law
Torts, and Due Process of Law, proposes what he calls a "better ana-
lytical model" for constitutional torts-a unitary due process ap-
proach-as against what he terms the Supreme Court's multifaceted
approach. In his view, the result of the Supreme Court's approach has
been a "doctrine that rests on flimsy foundations, and a body of rules
that do not serve ... constitutional values ... "2 In response, Profes-
sor Whitman in her article, Emphasizing the Constitutional in Consti-
tutional Torts, maintains that tort doctrines and categories do not
provide an appropriate model for constitutional decision-making. Her
position is that when it comes to constitutional claims, "torts is a dis-
traction."'3 Professor Beermann, in his Common Law Elements of the
Section 1983 Action, looks generally at the role of the common law of
torts in § 1983 interpretation. He then goes on to argue that, because
of its common law tort grounding, the Supreme Court's recent habeas
corpus/§ 1983 decision in Heck v. Humphrey has the potential to un-
dermine § 1983.
Professor Oren's article, Section 1983 and Sex Abuse in Schools:
Making a Federal Case Out of It, contends that tort concepts can and
should be used creatively in cases involving supervisory liability for
sex abuse in school. She approaches this supervisory liability issue as
an opportunity to engage § 1983 personal fault doctrine in a "dia-
'logue" with common law tort concepts. Finally, my article, The Re-
structuring of Narrative and Empathy in Section 1983 Cases, is not,
strictly speaking, about the relationship between § 1983 and tort con-
cepts. Nevertheless, in suggesting that the Supreme Court's qualified
immunity decisions have so structured the § 1983 litigation process
that judges are encouraged to empathize with individual defendants, I
intend to contrast that now-changed litigation process with the ordi-
2. Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of Law, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 617, 660 (1997).
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nary tort litigation process in which both sides have an equal opportu-
nity to narrate their stories.
As faculty editor of this Symposium, I wish to thank all of the
authors for their participation, as well as Professors Brown and Blum
and the AALS sections of Federal Courts and Civil Rights, for their
willingness to hold a joint program on this very important topic. I
expect this Symposium to make a significant contribution to future
academic and judicial discussions.

